

## ANTHROPOLOGY

### I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE OF MANKIND

#### A. Statements of the Doctrine

The *Second Helvetic Confession*, Chapter 7, states:

We say, also, that man doth consist of two, and those diverse substances in one person; of a soul Immortal (as that which being separated from his body doth neither sleep nor die), and a body mortal, which, notwithstanding, at the last judgment shall be raised again from the dead, that from henceforth the whole man may continue forever in life or in death.

Charles Hodge, in volume 2, p.42, of his *Systematic Theology* writes:

The Scriptures teach that God formed the body of man out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life and he became נִפְשָׁחַיָּהּ, a living soul. According to this account, man consists of two distinct principles, a body and a soul: the one material, the other immaterial; the one corporeal, the other spiritual. It is involved in this statement, first, that the soul of man is a substance; and secondly, that it is a substance distinct from the body. So that in the constitution of man two distinct substances are included.

Augustus Hopkins Strong, in Volume 2, p. 486, of his *Systematic Theology* says:

We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called ψυχή; viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called πνεῦμα. The πνεῦμα, then, is man's nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the πνεῦμα ἅγιον; the ψυχή is man's nature looking earthward, and touching the world of sense. The πνεῦμα is man's higher part, as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation; the ψυχή is man's higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation. Man's being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.

Lewis Sperry Chafer, in Volume 2, pp. 180-181 of his *Systematic Theology*, writes:

Is man a dichotomous being -- two parts, material and Immaterial, with the supposition that soul and spirit are the same -- or is he trichotomous -- body, soul, and spirit? It would be readily conceded by all that, under any consideration, there is not the same breadth of distinction observable between soul and spirit as between soul and body, or spirit and body