

With respect to the claim that the supralapsarian view is the most logical of all the views, the following must be said.

If God decrees the salvation or perdition of men considered as certain to be created but not yet decreed to be created, the question must be asked, How is the certainty of their creation established? That is, if these men are simply possibilities in the mind of God, how can their creation be considered as certainly future unless God decrees their creation? The same question must be asked concerning men considered as certain to fall, but not yet decreed to be permitted to fall: How is the certainty of their fall established? If their fall is simply a possibility in the mind of God, how can it be considered as certainly future unless God decrees to permit that fall?

If unspecified decrees of creation and permission of the fall lurk secretly in the background of (prior to) the predestinating decree, then this is no longer a supra (before) lapsarian (the fall) view, but an infra (after) lapsarian view!

If supralapsarians object to this line of reasoning, and assert that these predestined men are not merely possibilities in God's mind, but are certain possibilities, i.e., are certain in terms of reality or being, but are yet in potentiality rather than in actuality then the following questions and observations are in order. First of all, the distinction between potentiality and actuality is a valid one. That which is in potentiality is something which is certain to happen, but has not yet happened; that is, it is certain to pass from potentiality to actuality, but has not yet passed into actuality. If the predestinating decree is understood as decreeing the salvation of some and the perdition of other potentially created and potentially fallen men, then we are speaking of God's decreeing that which pertains to reality, to that which is certain to be, to actual existence, albeit in potentiality rather than actuality. (it may be seen that in this context potentiality and actuality are two states of actual, real existence.) in such a case, the predestinating decree has real men as its object.

However, if the predestinating decree has real persons as its object (i.e., God decrees the salvation and perdition of real persons who are yet in potentiality, but who will most certainly pass into actuality), then the question must be raised, How do real persons (whether potentially real or actually real) get to be real? How is the certainty of their existence established? Obviously, if God does not establish the certainty of their existence, they will never exist, but must always remain in the realm of pure possibility. And the only way in which their existence can become certain, is if God purposes (decrees) it.

This brings us full circle. If God is going to predestinate real people (potentially real people who have not yet come into existence), then He must make a prior decree to bring those people into existence at some future time. And further, If God is going to predestinate people who are certain to fall, then He must make a prior decree to permit the fall at some future time. That is, in order to purpose to do something to a real person, you must be sure that you have a real person (that is, you must first be sure that you are talking about a real person before you can talk about doing something to him). And, if you are going to purpose to do something to a person in a certain condition (for example, try to cure a person who is sick), you must be sure that you have a person in that certain condition (that is, you must first be sure that you are talking about a sick person before you can talk about attempting to cure him).